

Canada et al III.

Another Answer

TO THE

L E T T E R S

of the Right Hon.

WILLIAM PITT, Esq;

TO

RALPH ALLEN, Esq;

In which the Reasons are assigned for not venerating the Administration of that late Secretary of State, and for subscribing to the Term Adequate, in relation to the Peace,

BY ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE
CORPORATION OF BATH.

Ob hæc facta abs te Spernor.

TERENT.

LONDON, 1763.

twelve, thirteen, fourteen

SEP 19 1967

S I R,

AS Mr. Allen has been pleased, in his answers to your letters, relating to the Bath Address, to declare that he has the highest regard, and even veneration for your whole conduct in the ministry; and that he has no apology to make for the expression, *adequate*, as applied to the peace; permit me, who have neither regard nor veneration for your whole conduct, and who, as a member of the Corporation of Bath, am equally concerned with the apologist, to assign my reasons for consenting to the above term. By this I mean not only to shew you on what grounds that epithet appears just to my apprehension; but why it ought to appear so to yourself above all men living. But before I attempt to justify the propriety of that expression, be pleased to indulge me in laying down my reasons for not venerating your conduct.

There are many motives to be suggested, which might induce a person of Mr. Allen's humane disposition, to apologize for opinions in which he differs from you. And as he mentions gratitude to be one of them, that generous sensation may not have operated the least to the above purpose; because it was by your means, at the request of the expiring

B Mr.

Mr. Potter, that the Lambeth Doctor so amazingly ascended the throne of a right reverend father in god. As that ingenuous and mealy-mouthed divine is known to influence too much on the man of virtue, this veneration of your conduct may have been professed in order to coincide with the advertisement prefixed to that prelate's singular performance on the doctrine of grace. In that concise and extravagant production it is asserted, that, had you done two things, you would for the first time have been a copier; and of no less man than *Scipio Africanus*. The first of these is, "if you had undertaken the vindication of your ministry" the second, "if, after vindicating it, you had led the people to prayers." As you have neither endeavoured to vindicate your administration nor led the house of commons from their duty to their country, to that to their God, it remains that you are totally unlike the Roman whom the bishop obliquely insinuates you resemble. Indeed he acknowledges, that leading men to devotion is the *last* service a patriot minister can render to his country, wherefore I who am persuaded that you deserve not that illustrious appellation, am convinced also that you will never lead them to the temples of the Deity.

In any other man save the prelate of Gloucester, it had been surprizing that at the head of a performance on the subject of grace and truth, it should be declared that in performing
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the above particulars you had there only been a copier, when it is demonstrable from all your public actions, that you have trodden on the very steps and copied the very measures of your predecessors. And as misrepresentation bespeaks neither the influence of grace nor of truth, I am grieved that a right revend father in god, the champion for both, should have compared the opposition which has been made to your measures, by men of the first rank, to that of Nævius, an obscure plebeian, against those of Scipio.

Livy, whose grandeur and sublimity the prelate has profaned by his impure and poultry translation in his advertisement, without mentioning the name of Nævius, tells him that the two *Petillii*, *Tribunes* of the people, no obscure magistrates in Rome, were his accusers. Notwithstanding this silence of the historian on that head, the advocate of grace and truth has inserted, in order to adapt the words of Scipio to his candid manners and assertion, “let us leave then this fellow to himself,” a sentence which is not only an interpolation, but rank nonsense; unless his reverence can explain in what manner a man may be left *without* himself. But fir as the bishop has only mentioned two things which you have not done, as the grounds of resemblance between yourself and the Roman, if they had been done; permit me to assert that had you performed them, you had no more

resembled the illustrious Scipio than John Westley the Methodist, who has frequently led his followers from a defence of his conduct to the offering of prayers; and whom the right reverend prelate has exerted himself to prove the most ridiculous of all men.

In order therefore to complete the dissimilitude between you and Africanus, and to shew how many things you should have done to have created a just resemblance between you, I shall take the liberty of comparing his and your qualities and actions; and the rather that by this method I shall be enabled to explain why I do not venerate your conduct in the administration.

Scipio appears to have been a scholar from the known assistance which he afforded to Terence in the composition, characters and language of his Comedies. You appear not to be so, from the style and absurdities of all your letters, and particularly in your first to Mr. Allen, in which you do denominate the epithet adequate, which expresses *quality*, to be a description. The Roman was a gentleman, as is evinced from all his manners, and most expressly in his behaviour to the Spanish prince and princess. You seem to be altogether the contrary, from your universal arrogance to your superiors.

Scipio with singular modesty, after having subdued Spain, defeated Hanibal, and reduced the Carthaginians to sue for peace, offered

ferred to serve as lieutenant general under his brother, and executed that duty with due submission- You, Sir, puffed by conquests of other men, to which you little contributed, refused to serve your King, because you could not sovereignly over-rule him; to remain a member of his council, because you could not absolutely dictate therein; and renounced the representation of the city of Bath, because the constituents are not unanimously of your opinion; instances of insolence or delirium not to be exemplified in the histories of past ages.

Scipio when accused, of malversation of the public money, by the tribune of the people, declining the issue of a trial, whatever might be his reasons for that conduct, retired from Rome to Literninum, and lived and died in peace, without attempting to disturb the tranquility of his country.

You, after your fastidious resignation retired to Hayes, where you have been continually pregnant with ill-favoured brats which Lord Temple, your midwife, bringing into the world, has delivered to 'squire WILKES their dry nurse to be plentifully fed with the pap of impudence and sedition, in order to make them look plump and well-liking to the populace.

Africanus was an orator and a general, as is evident from the writings of the Roman historians, where force of argument, and elegance of expression evince the first, and his victories the second.

You

You are a declaimer and no general. Your bombast expressions, false metaphors, and inanity of argument manifest this truth. And you were never in the field of battle, but resigning your military professions, preferred the ministerially dragooning the English into expence and ruin, to that of riding a cornet in the troops of your sovereign.

Scipio improved his genius and understanding in the above excellencies by the constant study of the works of Xenophon.

You have derived your skill in declamation from Abernethy's sermons, your flowing and jejune language from Mason's Caractacus, your knowledge of the English constitution from Virgil's *Æneid*, and your *unalterable* opinions from Ovid's *Metamorphosis*, for these are known to be your favorite authors.

The Roman commanded in person in Spain, Africa and other kingdoms.

You have been totally unengaged in military employments of command.

The victories of Africanus were the works of his own hands and of his own wisdom, and proceeded from preparations which were adequate to the design. Yours were due to the courage and skill of other men, the capricious boons of fortune, and the blunders of your enemies; all which supplied the insufficiency of your preparations. Witness for the first, the conquest of Quebec by general Wolfe, for the second; the victory of Minden; for the

the third, the preservation of Quebec under general Murray, the capitulation of Gaudaloupe, and the management of the intended expedition from Brest.

Scipio preserved the lives and fortunes of his countrymen, and never planned expeditions but where the expence of the former, and conquest in the latter, were necessary to promote the public welfare.

You lavished our blood and treasure where no benefit could be derived to the nation, from the profusion ; and planned expeditions where victory could bring no advantage. Witness the thousands slain and starved in Germany, whose manes ought to haunt your slumbers. Witness your Knight-errant enterprizes on the coast of France against St. Maloes ; the defeat at St-Cas ; and your conquest of Bellisle, which, to this hour, remains inexplicable in what manner it could prove a benefit to England.

Africanus neither condemned the treaties which Rome had concluded, nor the administration of the great, because he was not in supreme command, nor applauded them when in it.

You, when out of office execrated the alliance with Prussia, and pronounced that the pursuit of German measures would undo this kingdom ; and yet when you received the reins of government, you renewed the treaty with Prussia, pursued the support of Hanover with infinitely more ardour than those whom you had supplanted ever presumed to attempt ;
and

and in this, with all due reverence to the prelate of Gloucester, you were a most servile copier of those whom you had egregiously affected to despise, or something less justifiable.

The Roman preferred none to places of command, but such whose intellect and talents adapted then to the discharge of their several duties. You declared in the house of commons that the misconduct of Lord Anson at the head of the Admiralty, was owing to his want of understanding, the most irremediable of all qualifications; and then by compromise restored him, and those whom you had frequently declared to be equally insufficient, to the posts from which they had been dismissed. You sent General Blythe to command the expedition against St. Cas, Abercrombie against Ticonderago, and Forbes against fort du Quesne.

Scipio preferred the wellfare of his native land to that of all other nations, and never defeated the design of her armaments to promote the measures of alien states. You ordered and sent the forces of England on the expedition against Rochefort. Let me now examine how far it is probable that the original intention of this equipment was influenced by the treaty of Closter Seven, and by orders not hitherto discovered by the public.

The circumstances on which I proceed shall be taken from the trial of Sir John Mordaunt and other evidence equally undeniably.

At

of England.

Mordaunt, dated the 5th of the same month,

urged

urged the embarkation with all possible expedition. On the 8th the convention was signed at Closter Seven.

Now fir I would gladly know on what account the transports were so long detained, after they were equiped for the purpose to which they were destined, and when the land forces only waited their arrival at Portsmouth, in order to proceed on the expedition, unless some secret transactions in Germany were the cause of that delay? Is it not probable also, that the transports were ordered to proceed, and the embarkation so emphatically urged, in your letter of the 5th of September, lest a longer detention might bring an account of the convention being signed on the 8th, before the armament might put to sea; and thereby more effectually disclose the secret of their retardation, and return without attempting a descent, than by sailing before the convention was publicly known in England to be ratified? Whatever might have been the result of such cunning at that time, in thus making the sailing orders to precede the ratification of the treaty by three days; at present such shallow artifices must be seen to the bottom; since it cannot be doubted, though the last hand was not put to the treaty of neutrality before the 8th of September, that the contents of it were known, and agreed to on the 5th in this kingdom.

On

On the 10th of that month advice was sent you, that the fleet was under sail; and it since appears that the orders which were given on the 5th of August, “ that the armament should “ return about the end of September,” were still unaltered and unrevoked, notwithstanding there remained, but one and twenty days for proceeding to the scene of action, executing the design, and returning to England. Could this neglect have happened, unless the resolution of their performing no real service, had imperceptibly operated on your mind, and effaced the attention of giving fresh orders? Or what appears still more probable, was it that the convention being settled, tho’ not signed, the possibility of its being not ratified withheld you from issuing fresh orders till the ratification took place, or the treaty was broken off? Since none could have been well given more decisive till the event of that negociation was certainly known.

Intelligence being received that the convention was signed, the ambiguity of the former situation was annihilated: and on the 15th the Viver sloop was dispatched with fresh orders after the fleet; and which arrived amongst them on the 22d, the day of their arrival in Basque road. These new instructions expressed, “ That notwithstanding the former “ orders, which had stated, the latter end of “ September, for their return, they should “ not consider the abovementioned time as

“ intended, in any manner to effect or inter-
 “ fere with the full execution of the first and
 “ principal object of the expedition, namely,
 “ a descent on the French coast near Roche-
 “ fort, &c. and that they should not desist
 “ from any attempt in which they were actu-
 “ ally engaged, on account of the time limit-
 “ ed for their return by the instructions above
 “ mentioned.”

The dimest eye must perceive that some-
 thing like this was necessary, to cover the
 grossness of leaving the former orders unre-
 voked; and to offer to the multitude, some
 pretext for avoiding the accusation of having
 suffered the former instructions to remain, which
 must have rendered the enterprize ineffectual.

Notwithstanding, in these orders by the Viper,
 a repetition of “ burning and destroying to the
 “ utmost of their power, all shipping, docks,
 “ magazines and arsenals, if practicable,” I doubt
 not to make it appear, that the blaze of these
 fiery commands was effectually extinguished, by
 the treaty of Closter Seven; and by some se-
 cret engine which was transmitted by the Viper
 sloop. And that the conduct of the com-
 manders, had they been directed by those or-
 ders alone which have been published, could
 never have proceeded in the manner in which
 it did.

Sir John Mordaunt, in answer to the instruc-
 tions transmitted by the Viper sloop, tells you
 in his letter, “ That he is pleased with think-
 “ ing,

ing, that before the receipt of your letter, he had judged right in resolving to attack l'isle d'Aix." Whence could this pleasure arise, since Sir Edward Hawke, in his letter to you, says, "It was a step in the general opinion necessary for securing the landing of the troops?" unless, being persuaded, that by being sent out to return in one and twenty days, that nothing was intended to be done, he was apprehensive that he had transgressed by that attack, and was now freed from his fears. Or what is more probable, that this pleasure proceeded from having resolved on attacking the very place, which it seems reasonable to believe, was mentioned in some secret instructions, in order to disguise the resolution of doing nothing material, by performing something which was the most like to it; and to convey a more probable appearance of a farther intention by the transacting that little.

Let me now enquire how far the design of that attack is to be explained, in the above manner, from subsequent circumstances. The first procedure, after the surrender of Aix, consisted in sending Messrs. Broderick, Douglas, Dennis and Buckle, on the 30th of Sepr. to examine the coast of France. At their return, these gentlemen signified under their hands, "that a landing was practicable." Whence did it then proceed, that the council of war, who knew no more of the coast at that time, Bro-
derick

derick excepted, than before they left England, should, in opposition to those who were the best judges of the matter on ocular proof, determine a descent impracticable? and wherefore did admiral Broderick, who has since sworn, "That a landing might have been made with ease, sign the resolution of the council of war, that a descent was neither advisable nor practicable," unless the Viper had carried out orders different from those which have been printed; and that he was induced to change his sentiments, from knowing on the 25th, what he was unacquainted with, on the 24th of Sep? and we shall see as we advance, that the chief subject of this council seems to have been an enquiry by what method the ostensible orders might be made to support a return without attempting a descent. On the 28th of the same month a council of war was again convened, and, "It was unanimously agreed that a descent was practicable, and that it was advisable to attack the two forts at the mouth of the river Charante." From what motives could this second resolution of landing the forces be adopted as advisable and practicable on the 28th, which had been determined to be unadvisable and impracticable on the 25th? Humanity forbids me to assign it to this cause; that having seen, since the 25th, more troops than before that time; they might hope that the defeat of the English, who
made

made the first descent, might plead the strongest argument for not accomplishing the object of the expedition ; and thereby conceal the true end of its design. Or, as the enemies which they had seen, did not promise to effectuate such defeat, did it arise from that part of the orders by the Viper which not limiting the time of their return, it became expedient to impart the semblance of a real attempt, whilst they were only protracting the hour, when a more specious countenance might be given to their return, without attempting to molest the enemy ? No sooner was the council of war broken up, than Mr. Broderick writes Sir Edward Hawke a letter signifying, “ That having prepared the boats with proper
 “ officers, &c. the general had come to a resolution not to land the forces that night,
 “ but to wait till day-light, ” day-light being come, and great part of the day advanced and no preparations for a descent being resumed, Sir Edward Hawke writes to Sir John Mordaunt, declaring that, “ Should the general officers of the troops have no farther
 “ military operations to propose considerable
 “ enough to authorize his detaining the squadron under his command, longer there,
 “ he begged leave to acquaint them that he
 “ intended to proceed with it to England
 “ without loss of time. ” To which Sir John Mordaunt replies, “ That talking with the
 “ land

“ land officers they had all agreed in returning
 “ to England.

Now, Sir, to what cause shall we assign the reasons wherefore a descent which was unanimously thought advisable in the evening, both by land and sea officers, and deferred till daylight, should be entirely laid aside by the land officers alone? Why did Sir Edward Hawke to whom orders were originally given, like those to Sir John Mordaunt, and who was therefore to obey the opinion of a majority of the council, resolve on returning to England without such a sanction? especially since, according to the orders by the Viper, he wanted no authority for tarrying out as long as he pleased. And why did Sir John Mordaunt, without remonstrating on this message of the admiral, decline an advisable descent; and without calling a council to know Sir Edward's reason for that resolution of returning, acquiesce therein?

Does it not seem probable, that since the public orders by the Viper expressed, “ That
 “ with regard to any particular attempt which
 “ the general shall have commenced, and in
 “ the execution whereof he shall be actually
 “ engaged that he does not desist, nor break
 “ up the same merely and solely on account
 “ of the time limited for the return, ” that it was thought prudent not to attack these forts? Left there being no visible force to oppose them, in all human probability, they
 must

must be taken, and that therefore, under such circumstances, there would be less excuse for not proceeding to the demolition of the shipping, stores and dock-yards at Rochefort, than for returning without attempting it.

Is it not probable from the preparations of the troops, officers, &c. in order to make the descent at night, then deferring it till morning, and ultimately rejecting it by the land forces alone, that this very affair had been determined in that manner in the council of war? and that Sir Edward's sending his resolution of returning to England, and Sir John Mordaunt's agreeing thereto, had made a part of the resolution of the same council? and that all these contrarious resolves, otherwise so inexplicable, arose from orders not yet made public? Is it not very probable that this whole transaction was conducted in this manner, for the sake of protracting the hour of return, and of giving to that delay, the countenance of a real intention to make a descent, in order to dazzle the populace with specious appearances? Without such previous resolutions, would Sir Edward Hawke have undertaken to return without the consent of a council of war, and have risked an enquiry into his conduct by a breach of orders?

From the preceding and subsequent conduct of these gentlemen, it is evinced, that they have, at all other times, behaved with the greatest conduct and courage, when danger

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has been infinitely more imminent than on this occasion ; and it can not be reasonably imagined they would, at this time, have comported themselves in this futile, contradictory, and irresolute manner, but from some instructions not yet communicated to the public.

From a comparison of these events with that of Closter Seven ; with the omission of revoking the original orders, and sending new ones to Sir John Mordaunt alone ; from the dispatch of the Viper Sloop after intelligence was received of the completion of the treaty of neutrality, is it not as clearly evinced that secret articles in the convention, to which the world is still a stranger, produced instructions which defeated this enterprize, as that the twilight is an emanation of the solar rays, tho' the source of them be yet invifible ? And would not a man denying his assent to the evidence of the former, be equally absurd with him who should refuse it to the latter ? Notwithstanding the evidence of what has been already offered, may suffice to convince all uninfatuated men of the truth of what I would prove ; the thread of probabilities, which completes the moral conviction, that this expedition was influenced by latent orders, is not yet totally unravelled.

Astonishing as this return without attempting a descent appeared in the eyes of all men, and clamourous as the nation became for an inquiry into the cause of it, you, Sir, remained

ed at ease, and nothing was proposed to satisfy the people on that head. At length your rival in oratory, the renowned Sir James Hodges, proposed to the common council of London, to instruct their members in order to bring a disquisition of this transaction before the parliament. Allarmed at this unforeseen event, you prepared to obviate the design, and to preclude all enquiry of that nature. You were convinced, that tho' a judge advocate might be instructed to ask what questions you thought proper and no others; that tho' a court martial might be composed of what members you pleased, and such persons and papers alone called for as you ordained, that the house of commons might ask what questions they pleased, that many of them were not to be influenced by your power, and that even yourself, and what persons and papers they demanded might be examined by them: and therefore that by such measures the whole proceedings of the expedition might be analyzed, and the component parts discovered. You were conscious also, that tho, a majority of that house might pronounce the commander guiltless; that the evidence of things might pronounce him guilty: and that by a revelation of the whole, your darling popularity might be completely annihilated. It is no wonder therefore, that you preferred the inquisition of a court martial to that of the national assembly, whose more immediate concern it is to de-

develop the causes of such flagrant failures. Whatever might have been your motives, a message was sent, to the Lord Mayor from the king, signifying, that his majesty had commanded the affair to be enquired into. This expedient prevented all application to parliament, and once more restored your bosom to tranquillity on that account. Tho' it was now become impracticable for you to avoid all enquiry into this affair, the manner in which it was begun, demonstrates the disinclination with which it was undertaken; and the precaution which was observed to evade even the research of a court martial. The continuance of it evinces the greatest care to exculpate the person to be tried, and to avoid a thorough examination of the matter. The first proceeding on this subject is a conviction of the truth of your endeavours, by all practicable means, to evade a trial. It was previously referred to three general officers, in order to enquire, whether the causes of this ineffectual armament, ought to be enquired into or not. A new and unexampled measure in cases so loudly demanding an examination, and, I believe, in all others. And as the persons to be examined, were not to depose on oath, and all preferment came from you, it is not impossible that the consideration of those particulars, might prevail not a little in the preference of this method.

Whatever

Whatever might have been your motives it appeared to these three officers, that the reasons for declining a descent were not satisfactory. In consideration of this, the affair was necessarily brought before a court martial, on the 14th of Decr. at Whitehall, and Sir John Mordaunt was charged with disobeying his Majesty's orders. From a review of these orders, it appears impossible, that Sir John Mordaunt could be found guilty. By the instructions of the 5th of August, he was obliged to follow the opinion of a majority of a council of war, the members of which were therein specified, and composed of four land, and four sea officers. Whilst the general adhered to this particular part of the orders, it is impossible he alone could be guilty of disobedience. In such case, the majority, or the whole, were the persons to be tried for disobedience, and not the commander in chief alone. And as by the same orders it was said, that the enterprize was to be attempted as far as it could be found practicable, a majority of the council, by the number, would seem to decide sufficiently of that circumstance.

When it is recollected also, that these orders were given eleven days after the battle of Hastenbeck, and a convention of neutrality was resolved to be proposed, does there not arise a suspicion that this unprecedented manner of rescinding a general from following his own conclusions, after having heard the
 opinions

opinions of others, was adopted for the sake of exculpating his conduct, should an enquiry, be made into it hereafter?

Notwithstanding these orders seem adequate to the imparting full power of deciding on any contingency which might intervene, and that it must appear to the council, from the limitation of the whole expedition to one and twenty days, that no essential injury was to be done to the enemy; it was not impossible but a majority might still appear in favour of a descent. In this case, the general, however self-satisfied he might be of the intention, that nothing of moment was to be executed, could not oppose such opinion without breach of orders, and appearing culpable in the eyes of all men.

Whether the possibility of such a majority in favour of a descent, and thereby being reduced, either to a compliance which might frustrate the negociation in Germany, or to the danger of being tried for disobedience, was the motive of Sir John Mordaunt's letter to you from Portsmouth, on the 11th of August I shall leave the world to decide. In that epistle, it is asked, "In what manner he is to
 " proceed, in case the fleet might be detained,
 " even in sight of the coast of France, for a
 " week or ten days, without being able to
 " get into the road of Rochefort, or of the
 " isle of Aix; during which time an alarm
 " will be necessarily given to those parts?"

To

To this you answered, “ That you are com-
 “ manded by the King to signify his majesty’s
 “ pleasure, that Sir John Mordaunt is to judge
 “ of the practicability of the services on the
 “ spot, according as contingent events, and
 “ particular circumstances may require.” Cer-
 tainly, Sir, this was a contingency, with-
 out farther power than what had been con-
 veyed by the orders, which came within the
 terms of judging of the practicability of a de-
 scent, and within the determination of a
 council of war. Does it not seem evident there-
 fore, that an eclairecissement on a subject al-
 ready so perfectly submitted to the judgment of
 a council of war was required to impart a
 power of the general’s dissenting from the
 majority thereof, provided their opinion should
 be in favour of a descent? Whatever may
 be the determination of the public on this par-
 ticular, it was now left to Sir John Mordaunt
 solely, under the circumstance of being seen
 from the coast, to follow his own opinion,
 in opposition to that of a council. And that
 this circumstance did arise, is evident from
 the testimony of Admiral Knowles, who de-
 poses, “ That at the council of the 24th, it
 “ was taken for granted, that the French had
 “ intelligence of their designs,” and there-
 fore the general was at liberty to follow his
 own opinion, or that of the council as he
 pleased. Thus by the effect of these double and
 contradictory instructions, it was contrived,
 that

that if the general was accused alone, he might exculpate himself by appealing to the first orders, and following the judgment of the council : and if the whole council was accused, that then they might clear themselves by having followed the general's second orders. And we have seen, that on the spot, part of the resolutions was transacted in council, and part by the general's commands, and thus a preparation was early made to obviate the mischief which might arrive from either question. Hence it is evident, as these different orders, and the circumstance of the fleet's being seen, were known before the proceeding to trial, that it was impossible Sir John Mordaunt could be found guilty ; since he must follow, either the judgment of the majority, or his own. In either of which cases, he was justified under your hand, and in consequence of these orders, which the general urged in his defence, he was necessarily pronounced not guilty by the court ; the sentence which must inevitably be foreseen to happen.

Now, Sir, when it is considered that the first orders were delivered eleven days, and the second, by your letter nineteen after the battle of Hastenbeck, at which time the treaty of Closter Seven had been determined on, and commenced, is it not probable that both were formed and not revoked, with a view to the conclusion of that event, and of exculpating the general ? and that when the convention was
signed,

signed, that more explicit instructions were sent by the Viper which the world has not yet seen, and probably, never may see?

Let us now enquire whether the minutes of the council, on the 25th of Sept. delivered on the trial by Admiral Knowles, will not corroborate what has hitherto been laid down?

The first thing considered, was the original orders given to the general and to the admiral, and the result of it was, that they were to be followed "as far as found practicable." Now as the paper, signed by Admiral Broderick and the other naval officers, asserting the practicability, declared for a descent; the debate was, whether intelligence was, "To be believed before making the trial" of this practicability of a descent, and since a trial was to prove the practicability, or not, why was that trial to be deferred till the enemy was better provided by length of time, to convene a greater force, and to oppose it? We find also, by the conclusion of its being impracticable, that no attention was paid to this intelligence. To what can this conclusion be ascribed? but to some secret orders not to make a descent, or to delay the time till the enemy had gotten together ample forces to render a descent impracticable when attempted? Why otherwise did Mr. Broderick, who had subscribed the facility of a landing, in contradiction to the evidence of his own
E eyes.

eyes sign the resolution of the council, that it was inadvisable and impracticable?

Having concluded that intelligence is not to be believed, the next object was Sir John Mordaunt's letter to you of the 11th of August, and yours in answer of the 13th, relative to the case of being discovered by the French. On this it was resolved that, "It was clear he had the power of judging," and Mr. Knowles informs us on his evidence, that it was at that time, "Taken for granted, that the French had intelligence of their designs of the expedition." Now, Sir, is it not unaccountable, why intelligence, upon the examination and evidence of sufficient men, that a landing was practicable, should be rejected, and why a thing should be taken for granted without evidence, unless there were secret reasons, for refusing the former, and receiving the latter? or that the general might chuse to follow the council, or his own opinion as he thought fit? The next thing which came before the council, was the published letter, sent by the Viper Sloop. On this it was agreed that no time was limited for their return.

Does it not follow from the resolution of the 28th, by which a landing was deemed advisable, that this resolve was delayed to give the enemy time to render it impracticable, as it had been agreed that nothing but an attempt could prove the practicability, or the contrary? or that, as no
time

time was limited for returning, that some days should be wasted in seeming preparations, till a better face might be given to their return? And does not the whole proceed, too manifestly to be doubted, from some secret order, carried out by the Viper, which were to render the expedition abortive? Thro' the whole conduct of this trial, it is observable with what lenity the prisoner is treated, and nothing can give this observation a more convictive force, than a comparison of it, with those of Admiral Byng, and of Lord George Sackville.

It is remarkable, that in support of the charge, no witnesses were called, except Colonel Clark, Colonel Wolfe, and Admiral Broderick, the latter of whom being a member of the council, was equally interested with the General in his exculpation.

The first and last positively declare the practicability of a landing, the second something equivalent thereto; the opinions of all, being eyewitnesses of the subject, ought to be regarded in preference to those who had never examined it, particularly that of General Wolfe, by all true Englishmen. A commander who proved his superior skill, courage and fidelity to his country, in obtaining that memorable victory in which he fell, and for which you triumphed.

The witnesses called on the part of the General, were, for the most part, men whose fate and
 E 2 reputation

reputation depended on those of him who stood before the tribunal. Men who were equally the objects of national enquiry, and who might truly be said to give testimony in their own cause. A permission which the laws of England have justly inhibited, tho' those of a court-martial admitted it. During the proceedings of the whole court-martial, it is evident that, the utmost precaution was observed to prove, that the regular siege of Rocheforte was impracticable, tho' as no cannon or mortars had been sent out for such an attempt; it was evident that a siege was not the original object, or that it was designedly rendered impracticable: and that no regard, respecting the situation of that place, was paid to Colonel Clark, and those who had agreed with him. Not a question was asked, whether, after landing, the ships, stores, &c. at Rochefort, might have been burned or not, without taking the city; and this, even tho' that object constituted the most material part of the orders. Great pains also were taken to prove that Fort Fouras could not be approached near enough to be battered by the ships of war; which, if true, is a proof that the French had built an useless fortification: and not a question is asked why the forts at the entrance of the Charante were not attacked; and yet it appears from the evidence of Sir Edward Hawke, " That an attack on " Fouras, as well as that on Aix, had no con- " nexion with the principal object in his " Majesty's instructions. " From

From the most unprejudiced survey of the whole, the questions, which were asked of the witnesses, appear to have been formed relative to the taking Rocheforte and Fouras, because the most plausible answers could be given thereto; and none were asked which led to a discovery of the causes for declining the other articles. Have you a better reason for this conduct, than that no satisfactory answer can be given to the latter?

Such have, at all times, been my *unalterable* sentiments of the expedition to Rocheforte; and tho' it was prevented from being seen in this light at the time of the transaction, while the blaze of your antigermanic protestations was too dazzling in the eyes of the populace, to permit the discernment of truth; yet at present, when that glare is eclipsed by your subsequent germanic actions, I presume that few who read these pages, will remain unconvinced of the falacy which then prevailed.

Indeed you yourself, after the return of the expedition, seemed not a little conscious, that your hitherto undiscovered revolt from English to alien interests, would hardly prove sufficiently opaque to conceal the true motives of that conduct. Was it not therefore on that account, inserted in the foreign gazettes, and thence translated into the English papers, accompanied with the name of Lord Holderneffe, "That the convention of Closter Seven
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“ was concluded without the knowledge of the court of England.” An assertion, which since your anabaptist immersion in the ocean of continental extravagance can hardly be credited by the most squint-eyed and seditious of your admirers.

Permit me, Sir, to ask you also, when the treaty of Closter Seven was completed, why were you bullied by the menaces of the King of Prussia into the infraction of it, when by adhering to its stipulations, that country had remained in a neutral state, and all that sea of blood, and immense wealth, which since that time have been poured forth in its protection, had been saved to this nation.

By this time, Sir, you may discern how many deeds you ought to have performed, and what different qualities you ought to have possessed, to have created a resemblance, between you and the illustrious Roman, besides those two mentioned by the prelate of grace at Gloucester: and certain I am, that had Scipio, who was accused of unbecoming acts long passed, afforded any thing so suspicious in his conduct, he had not only been impeached, but condemned by the Roman people. And if you should hereafter be called upon to answer for your ministry, you will do well to imitate the Roman in one thing, and decline the inquest of a national examination, if it be practicable.

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Notwithstanding, by the above comparison you may not appear to have derived any great advantage to your character, yet as I am equally a lover of grace and truth with the prelate of Gloucester, there are heroes of no less renown than Scipio himself, whom you certainly resemble. Wherefore to prove my impartiality and your excellences, I shall lay them before you and the world.

Amongst these, there was one Don Quixote, famed in story, whom you manifestly resemble in head; and one Oliver Cromwell, of execrable renown, whom you seem to resemble in heart. As to the similitude with the former, certainly the mistaking Belleisle for an *important* conquest, is not less romantic, than mistaking a barber's bason for Mambriño's helmet. And in imagining a nation can be aggrandized and enriched, by conquests which devour her subjects, and exhaust her treasure to twenty times the value of the acquisitions which could possibly have been retained, is it less visionary than the knight-errant's believing he could rescue two flying lovers from the inhuman Moors, by demolishing Punch at a Puppet-show? In like manner, in reflecting on the sublimity which you blindly affect above other men; is it possible to preclude the idea of the blind-folded Don, who, cornet-like, mounted on a wooden horse, imagined himself exalted into the higher regions of the air, from the wind of
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four pair of bellows, which were blowing in his backside, by the hands of the populace. As to your resemblance of the Arch-Rebel, does it not strongly appear when you presumed to expect the implicit obedience of your Sovereign, and his council to your behests, to dictate the names of every man who should be in the cabinet, or in office, and to rule the kingdom without contradiction or controul. And is not your affected humility greatly a-kin to his assumed hypocrisy? yet, thanks be to the immortal God, your intellect is unequal to the guidance of such ambitious inclinations; and the true features of your soul were known before the former were carried into perfect execution.

Having in this manner partly explained why I can entertain no veneration for your ministry; permit me to proceed, and to assign my reasons for concluding the terms of pacification, to be adequate to all the expectations of reasonable beings; and for asserting that you, above all men, ought to think in that manner.

In doing this, you will give me leave to examine the articles of that peace, which you would have concluded; wherefore you broke it off; and then delineating the circumstances of things as they existed at the conclusion of hostilities, to compare it with that which is made. And as in the affair of Rochefort, I have taken the whole from the trial of Sir John Mordaunt, in this I shall derive my intelligence from the historical memorial
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of your negociation the authenticity of which is equally incontrovertible.

The first proposition by the French, for the grounds of pacification were, that each party should retain the conquests they had made.

England had then in her hands Canada, the islands of Cape-Breton and St. John in the gulf of St. Lawrence; in South America the isles of Guadaloupe and Marigalante; in Africa, Senegal, and the island of Goree; in Asia, Pondicherry and the French settlements on the coast of Coromandel; and the French were excluded from Newfoundland, and fishing on the banks thereof. Added to these the French ministry, in an ironical and satyric sneer, told you that the *important* conquest of Bellisle should remain with England, tho' it was undertaken and completed, after the proposition of the *uti possidetis*. The conquests of France consisted, in Asia, of the English settlements on the coast of Sumatra; in Europe, of Minorca, the Landgraviate of Hesse, the county of Hanau, and the town of Gottingen in the Electorate of Hanover.

This proposition, Sir, of each keeping what they had acquired, was the most reasonable which could have been made, and the most advantageous which ought to have been expected; since the conquests we had acquired, would then have remained exactly as they were, and the whole result of our superiority would have been secured by the treaty of

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Peace

peace. Let me ask you, if you are so perfectly persuaded, as you seem to be, of the excess of the value of the English acquisitions beyond those of France; if you are at your heart, the patriot minister which you profess by your lips; wherefore did you decline accepting those terms, The utmost which the most sanguine wish could reasonably desire? Why did you renounce the preservation of the Newfoundland fishery, which was offered you by the term of the *uti possidetis*? Can it be ascribed to any other cause, than to a conviction that our boasted acquisitions were not worth more than those of France; or to your preference of alien interests, beyond those of your bleeding and exhausted country? whatever were your motives, those most reasonable propositions, of both sovereigns retaining the conquests they had acquired, were rejected by you, and a treaty was entered upon, grounded on an exchange of the countries conquered on each side.

The treaty being advanced to declare what should be restored and retained, it appears that you had agreed to give back, in effect, every thing but Canada. You had, indeed reserved Cape-Breton and St. John, but then you were to restore the liberty of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, and of preparing the fish on the shores of that island, no inconsiderable part of the conquest which had been made; and you added there-
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to the island of St. Pierre, in all respects equal to Cape-Breton, respecting the fishery. Why then do you roar at present against a measure, which you yourself had embraced? You reserved also Senegal and Goree, but you returned in lieu thereof a liberty of settling on some other part of the coast of Africa. Thus in fact, Canada was the sole remain of all the acquisitions we had made; and which you had agreed to accept in recompence for all the thousands slain, and millions wasted by your administration. How well that country is worth the price of so much blood and treasure, the people of England are now truly convinced.

Such having been the terms on which you would have concluded hostilities, Canada alone, after a fair estimation of the values of what had been acquired on both sides, must, in your *unalterable* opinion, have been the sole advantage which rested on the part of the English. This circumstance must eternally contradict your declamations on the vast superiority of our success; or it will stand an everlasting monument of your postponing your country's good to that of German princes: and this latter seems, aye more than seems, the true reason of your rejecting the *uti possidetis*, in order to regain the dominions of Germans by an exchange of the conquests of Englishmen. Nay it is manifest you defeated the effects of this treaty, because the French would not give

up Wesel and Guelders to the King of Prussia; territories, the income of which is unequal to the five hundredth part of that money which the English were obliged to raise for the support of one year's war.

The day was now arrived, when your boundless vanity had lifted you above mortal height, and when you looked down with sovereign contempt, on kings and councils, saving on the Monarch of Prussia. He, in his letters, having penetrated your prevailing weakness, fed you with the seductive food of flattery and admiration; and laughed in secret, at the facility with which he had persuaded you into a high and *unalterable* opinion of your superior talents and ministerial capacity; the sole opinion which you have not altered, and which above all others, you ought to have changed. During this time, he smilingly received the annual subsidy of six hundred and seventy thousand pounds from England; and by the coinage of base money, which was permitted to be exchanged in the English army for sterling gold, enriched himself; and in a war, carried on for his own interest, filled his coffers, whilst those of England were exhausting in support of him, and of other states equally alienated from the welfare of this kingdom. These facts include also a part of my reasons for not venerating your administration.

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Your resignation being superbly made, a war with Spain, a measure which you adopted, soon broke out; and it was thought proper to support the kingdom of Portugal with men and money, at a great expence. To this succeeded the conquest of Martinico, and of the Hayanah; the latter of which, besides the immense amount of the equipment, cost the nation twelve thousand of as valiant men as ever acquired victory. Affairs were now circumstanced in the following manner. The French had acquired Spain, a new ally, who was enabled amply to supply them with military force and bullion; and we had supported Portugal with an army and a million of money, who could afford us neither of them. We had taken Martinique and the Havanah. The source of the Newfoundland trade was greatly diminished by the war with Spain. And by the Spaniard's reduction of Portugal, which it was impracticable to prevent, and by a prohibition of commerce in Naples and Sicilly which was at the option of the king of Spain, and would certainly have taken place, the sale of Newfoundland fish would have been totally annihilated. Added to this, the Norwegians had declined the making Stock-fish, and had followed the English manner of making dried fish, and had supplied the markets in the Mediterranean with considerable quantities of the latter. The expences of the war were now mounted to more than
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twenty millions annually, and the naval and land services demanded many thousands of our useful subjects, to recruit the fleets and armies. It was now evident to all thinking men, who loved their country, that it was impossible hostilities could be continued, tho' victory should attend every enterprize and engagement, without the ruin of England. No part of the Newfoundland fishery could be long preserved, because it would be impossible to find markets for their fish; and none would adventure in that trade, where there could be no sale for their commodities. It was seen that the Norwegians being engaged in, and ardently pursuing the making Baccalao, would, by a few years uninterrupted enjoyment of that commerce, usurp the whole: and that the Spaniards and other nations, by being accustomed to the eating that Norwegian product, tho' it was at first less palatable than the English, would by custom, be brought to like the former equally with the latter; and that in consequence thereof, should the war continue a few years, that trade and the profits of it, which must now be rescinded during hostilities, would then be lost for ever. It was evident, that tho' this fishery should never return to us, at the day of peace, which must at some time arrive, it would go to the French; because, by the discipline of their religion they consume that kind of food which we do not. The ministry therefore, seeing the kingdom in
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that state, respecting this commerce, the great source of our wealth, and the nursery of our seamen, concluded it was better to suffer the French to participate therein, than by a longer war, totally to exclude ourselves, and in fact, resign the whole to our enemies. By this change of circumstances there was a cause for not retaining Newfoundland, which existed not, when you proposed to give it up.

Tho' the conquest of Martinique and the Havanah were pleasing circumstances, yet those who saw deeper than the surface, compared the expence with the acquisition. They were convinced, that by persisting in war, and even by taking the whole Spanish settlements, we should so totally exhaust the nation of men, and load the manufactories with taxes, that we should have neither hands to make any considerable quantity of commodities, nor a power of exporting them occasioned by the enormous price at which they must be wrought; and that in consequence of this, the chief object of a commercial nation, would be annihilated.

Notwithstanding the loans might be raised for the succeeding year, it was seen, that the imposts which must be laid to pay the interests of them, would necessarily fail; because the common people, whose consumptions must supply the greatest part of these taxes, were already necessitated to spend their whole income. As the effect of this, when any article became

became dearer by a new duty, and more money was required to purchase it, they were compelled to purchase less of those commodities, which were already taxed to the full. By these means what the revenue acquired by the new duty, it lost in those which had been previously imposed ; and the whole income, after the addition of the new impost, would not exceed what was produced before.

On this account, it was foreseen, that a few years, perhaps the next, must produce a national bankruptcy, since none would lend money on parliamentary security, when they saw that security could not supply the interest. To this condition, your profusion has reduced your country.

In consequence of this, it was evident, could the enemy protract the war, but a few campaigns, and there could exist no doubt of that ability, since the Spaniard had joined him, that tho' they should be defeated in every battle, the impossibility of finding the supplies producing a bankruptcy would compel the English to sue for peace ; and that then the vanquished would settle the pacification as they pleased, and thus this nation would be undone by her victories and triumphs.

Besides these considerations, there was another yet more urgent, because more present. It was found, that tho' many thousands of subjects were wanted to supply the loss of those, whom your profusion had destroyed, in our
fleets,

fleets and armies; yet that a few hundreds only could be raised, and these even at the enormous price of twenty guineas a man. For these reasons, his majesty and the ministry foreseeing that the want of soldiers might transfer victory to our foes, deemed it the most salutary measure, to enter upon terms of pacification; and peace was concluded.

By this treaty the neutral islands were divided; we retained Senegal, all Canada, Cape-Breton, St. John's and the other parts of North America, possessed by the French, New Orleans excepted; and the river Mississippi was made the boundry of our dominions in the new world. We acquired from the Spaniard, St. Augustine and the territory around it; and the long contested right of cutting Logwood was settled in our favour. In Asia, we reserved our conquests; and we preserved our Newfoundland fishery by the speediness of the peace, which would have been lost by a continuance of the war: a circumstance which was of no import, when you had proposed to restore the French to that privilege, because at that time we had no rupture with Spain, and our markets were still open.

Now, Sir, I would desire you to compare the circumstances and motives for making peace, as they existed at that time, and the territories we have attained; with those which existed when you proposed a treaty, and with

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what you would have been content, to have concluded hostilities; and I am persuaded it will be found that the terms of pacification will appear adequate to our situation and conquests, preferable to those which you would have accepted, and that you, above all men, ought to think them *adequate*.

With what face then, could you demand of his majesty, a disavowal of that peace which has been concluded; when you yourself would have induced him to have subscribed a worse, after your rejecting the best which could have been made, the reservation of all our conquests; and which was proposed by the French? Will nothing satisfy your cormorant ambition, less than reducing your king, to become the most abject being of the realm? plead your excuse by that insanity which has frequently affected the heads of your family; the best apology your friends can offer, and you can receive.

In this manner I shall conclude my reasons for subscribing to the term *adequate* in the Bath address, and for not beholding your ministry with veneration.

Having advanced thus much, in favour of my sentiments on this subject, permit me to tell you, that I am not a little surpris'd at your expression of *unalterable* opinion, in your letter to Mr. Allen. From your past conduct, what reason is there to conceive that *your* opinion would ever prove *unalterable*? is it from

from your having execrated Sir Robert Walpole and his measures, and treating your Sovereign with scarce less indecency; then receiving a post, extolling the administration of the former to the skies, and declaring, that the annals of the latter, were the whitest in the English history? Is it from receiving a legacy of ten thousand pounds on conditions of never accepting a post, and then securing yourself by parliamentary authority from the penalty of repayment, in order that you might accept it? as you did.

Is it from your relapse into the most invective declamations against the ministry of the Pelhams, then receiving another post, and pronouncing, that their conduct had proved the most salutary to the nation?

Is it from declaring, that some men then in high offices, were incapable, of discharging the duty of them, thro' want of intellect; procuring their removal, and then reinstating them as sufficient men?

Is it from your asserting that Hanover would prove the millstone which would sink this kingdom into perdition, and then encreasing the weight of that millstone by infinitely more expence than your predecessors would ever have presumed to have done?

Is it from your declaring, that neither a man nor a guinea should cross the channel into Germany, then transporting more of both than had ever been known to have been

transported? is it from pronouncing that German measures must impede or prevent the american conquests, and then declaring, that America was conquered in Germany? And lastly, that no one possible absurdity may remain uncommitted by you, is it from your execration of the peace, peace-makers, and peace-approvers, and then demanding Mr. Townshend as your associate in the secretariship, and agreeing with Lord B---e, to screen him from national resentment, in order that he might repave your way to power? but your ~~in~~arrogance ⁱⁿ demanding from your S---n, more than impudence had ever asked in one subject from another, You were defeated in the presumption of your demands; and his Lordship received the mortifying conviction, that no favour could induce his M——y to forfeit his own honour, or renounce his subjects welfare. Is it from these instances, or from what part of the history of your life is it to be inferred, that your opinions are *unalterable*? I am so far convinced, that a contrary and alterable disposition prevails in you, that I would pledge my salvation on the event, should his Majesty propose to restore you to power, you would now accept it on terms of approving the late ministry of Lord Bute, and every article of the peace, and that you would rise in the house of commons; unembarrassed and unabashed, for wherefore should you decline a repetition of what you have so often done,
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and harangue two whole houres to that purpose. What avail then your "declarations in parliament concerning that treaty," and what credit ought to be given to your assertion of *unalterable* opinion, who have hitherto kept none unaltered?

As to the argument of the "Impossibility of your obeying the commands of the Bath corporation," because of your different and *unalterable* opinion. I see not that it contains the least reason. Because, in your second letter to Mr. Allen, "You declare yourself their servant." By what motives are servants obliged to be of the same opinion with their masters, in the service which is required of them? It is their duty to obey, and not to examine the contents of their commissions. In what manner then would the delivery of the address have been "A disavowal of your opinion"?

When, you say, "You formed your opinion of the peace, with sincerity according to such lights as your little experience, and small portion of understanding could offer you." From your preceding actions, I can not abstain from doubting of your sincerity: and was the opinion of your parts, as humble as you affect to express it, you would have acquiesced with the sentiments of the house of commons, who voted the peace, both reasonable and adequate. But who perceives not that trite, poultry, and ironic sneer, which is conveyed

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conveyed in these humiliating words, "In
" leaving others, with much deference to their
" better information, to follow their own
" judgment." Did this proceed from a real
modesty, would you have declined represent-
ing a city because the constituents of it were
of a different opinion from yourself? It is the
inseparable characteristic of modesty, to al-
low that liberty in others, which she herself
assumes. No Sir, this haughty conduct which
you have adopted, proceeds from the same in-
sulting and tyrannic spirit which not bearing
a difference of judgment in his Majesty,
and his privy council, disdains the citizens of
Bath, who presume to entertain a different
opinion from yourself.

Such, Sir, are my sentiments of you, and
of the peace, and I shall venture to assert
" that your equitable and good friends will be
" so good not to trouble you with another in-
" vitation to represent them," and it is my
opinion, that if you persist in refusing to re-
present a place till the constituents are unani-
mously of your *unalterable* opinion, that this is
the last parliament in which you will be a re-
presentative.

I am &c.

Bath, August 30th,
1763.

ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE
CORPORATION OF BATH.